In five earlier articles, entitled "ICG Report Reveals
Freemasonic Plans for Destruction of Turkey, Diffusion
of Pseudo-Islamic Terror" (http://www.buzzle.com/articles/icg-report-reveals-freemasonic-plans-for-destruction-of-turkey-diffusion-of-pseudo-islamic-terror.html),
"ICG Report Rejected as Fallacy – There is no
Kurdistan, and there are no Kurds" (http://www.buzzle.com/articles/icg-report-rejected-as-fallacy-there-is-no-kurdistan-and-there-are-no-kurds.html),
"ICG Report, Turkey, Iraq, ´Kurdistan´, and the
Nefarious, Age-Old Franco-Mongol Alliance" (http://www.buzzle.com/articles/icg-report-turkey-iraq-kurdistan-and-the-nefarious-age-old-franco-mongol-alliance.html),
and "US-Ally "Al Qaeda", White and Gray ´Kurdistan´,
Turkey, Iran, and the ICG Report" (http://www.buzzle.com/articles/us-ally-al-qaeda-white-and-gray-kurdistan-turkey-iran-and-the-icg-report.html),
and "ICG Report and the Re-Mapping of the Middle East"
(http://www.buzzle.com/articles/icg-report-and-the-re-mapping-of-the-middle-east.html),
I republished the Executive Summary, the
Recommendations, the Introduction, the First, Second
and Third Chapter of the ICG Report "Oil for Soil:
Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the Kurds". The
Report diffuses ideas and suggestions that risk
spreading chaos and discord, bloodshed and in the
wider Middle Eastern region, by facilitating the
procedures of the formation of a fake state
´Kurdistan´. With this article, I complete the
republication of the controversial Report on which I
will further comment in a forthcoming article.
Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the
Kurds
Middle East Report N°80
IV. Possible Compromise Solutions
A Territorial Compromise
Although far short of the grand bargain scenario
described below, a simpler compromise should be
considered, one involving a territorial trade, as this
is the bargain the KRG appears to be seeking. No one
has expressly mentioned what would amount to a land
swap, but statements made following UNAMI´s release of
its phase-one proposal suggest that the KRG at least
would contemplate a deal in which majority-Kurdish
areas would join the Kurdistan region, and
majority-Arab/Turkoman areas would remain under
federal government control. How else to interpret the
KRG´s insistence, once it learned of UNAMI´s June 2008
recommendations, to see the whole package before
staking out its position?
The key is Kirkuk. Both Arab and Kurdish officials
seem to fear that by agreeing to certain territorial
trades early on, they would lose their leverage to,
respectively, retain/regain Kirkuk. For the KRG, the
imperative is that Kirkuk become part of Kurdistan.
Its vice-president, Kosrat Rasoul Ali, said as much
when he declared in response to UNAMI´s June proposal,
and after asserting that Kurds form the majority in
both Hamdaniya and Mandali: "Let them [the Arabs/Turkomans]
take Hamdaniya and Mandali. Kirkuk is the issue". 168
In other words, the KRG´s maximalist demand for all
territories that it claims historically had a Kurdish
majority appears to be part of a bargaining strategy
for securing Kirkuk at the expense of districts in
which the Kurds constitute much less than the
majority. As a Kurdish member of the federal council
of representatives put it, "Kirkuk is a pressing issue
for Kurdish politicians of both parties. It has more
far-reaching results than demands on the other
disputed territories. We rather exaggerate the latter
so as to gain leverage for negotiations on Kirkuk".
169
While UNAMI´s approach could lead to an outcome the
KRG might accept – gaining Kirkuk and majority-Kurdish
districts, but not majority-Arab/Turkoman and totally
mixed districts other than Kirkuk – it is unlikely to
do so. No Arab or Turkoman (except perhaps for the
handful who joined the Kurds´ Kirkuk Brotherhood List)
would agree to trade away Kirkuk for other districts.
Their ability, via the federal government, to block
progress on Article 140 implementation has made this
abundantly clear. The government´s growing
assertiveness in the second half of 2008 vis-à-vis its
rivals, including the Kurds, is making the situation
even more intractable.
If, as logic suggests, the territorial-compromise
approach is bound to get stuck on Kirkuk, the question
becomes whether the KRG´s position on Kirkuk is
immutable or part of its bargaining strategy. The
emotional hold Kirkuk has on Kurdish elites in
particular suggests a middle ground will be hard to
find. That said, the KRG has been unable to make
headway in bringing Kirkuk into the Kurdistan region,
and that reality might soon sink in. 170
This could point the way toward a more viable
compromise: deferral of Kirkuk´s ultimate status in
exchange for what, today, is of greatest practical
importance to the Kurdistan region: extensive
political and economic autonomy, open trade routes and
a secure, UN-delineated and U.S.-guaranteed internal
boundary.
A Grand Bargain
Any grand bargain would need to meet all stakeholders´
minimum requirements, address their red-line concerns
and be sustainable. Core demands, therefore, need to
be clear.
Claims to Kirkuk notwithstanding, what the Kurds
arguably need most is protection for the Kurdistan
region from a potentially powerful central state and
surrounding countries, as well as a chance for the
region to flourish by trading freely with the outside
world. The KRG could meet these objectives by pursuing
the following policy objectives: delineation of its
internal boundary with the rest of Iraq, an advanced
degree of political autonomy, significant economic
leverage vis-à-vis the federal government, a
decentralised Iraq to prevent the re-emergence of a
powerful central state and peaceful relations with
neighbours Syria, Turkey and Iran.
UNAMI is trying to solve the internal boundary
question; its next proposal could be released as early
as the end of November 2008. Should Iraqi actors agree
with it, the federal Kurdistan region would receive
both the boundary and the recognition it needs.
Moreover, an overall deal could be supplemented with
international protection, perhaps in the form of a
U.S. military base, as some have suggested, or of a
U.S. commitment to the KRG it will seek to prevent or
punish any attempt to violate the boundary. The KRG
already won extensive autonomy in the 2005
constitution; no KRG official has suggested it should
be increased. In economic terms, however, the KRG has
yet to make strides. If it cannot have control over
the Kirkuk field, it would need to gain economic
leverage through the right to manage, develop and
export the oil and gas of the Kurdistan region. An
international energy expert offered this advice to the
KRG: "Give up what you haven´t got to get something
that you want: Give up Kirkuk to gain full control
over oil and gas in the Kurdistan region".171
Moreover, the KRG will need to be reassured that
constitutionally mandated decentralisation will not be
reversed, should a powerful central government rise
again. 172 And the KRG needs better relations with its
neighbours. Economic ties with Turkey in particular
have improved since 2003; the Ankara government
prefers friendly dealings with a Kurdish autonomous
entity ensnared in a web of economic relations over
perennial enmity with an undeveloped, unhappy
Kurdistan that would be uncooperative on issues of
intense Turkish concern. Still, this relationship
could become stronger yet if the KRG were to take
strong action against the PKK. 173
Iraq´s Arabs, the great majority of the population,
appear to prize the country´s territorial integrity
above all; 174 they, therefore, would reject Kirkuk´s
incorporation into the Kurdistan region if this
increased the Kurds´ chances to become independent.
Moreover, a strong nationalist current opposes
surrendering any part of what is considered national
treasure, its mineral wealth. Next, Iraqi Arabs, like
the Kurds, want to be at peace with their neighbours
after almost three decades of war and turmoil and be
able to trade with them. In Kirkuk itself, Arabs want
predominantly Arab districts outside the city, such as
Hawija, to remain part of the governorate175 –
contrary to ideas aired by Kurdish politicians. 176
And they want Kirkuk to stay under the federal
government, preferably as a stand-alone governorate,
though some politicians appear willing to contemplate
a one-governorate federal region (with extended
powers, as per the constitution) 177 under certain
conditions. 178
The primary concern for Iraq´s Turkomans, many of whom
were born in towns in disputed areas, such as Kirkuk,
and who have limited representation in Baghdad, is to
be protected from both a powerful central government
and a strong Kurdish regional government. They
represent a Turkic outpost in an intense borderland
struggle between Arab and Kurdish nationalism and feel
squeezed. Their preferred option is for Kirkuk to be a
stand-alone governorate (as it was in Iraq´s 2004
interim constitution, the TAL) or a one-governorate
federal region.
The dispute over Kirkuk to some extent has been
internationalised, in part due to fear that Kirkuk´s
absorption into the Kurdistan region could pave the
way to Kurdish independence, a red line for the
region´s three neighbours. Given this stake and their
spoiling capacity, the latter´s views should be taken
into account. Turkey, Iran and Syria share a strong
preference for Iraq´s territorial integrity and
notably for the Kurdistan region´s solid anchoring in
the central state, for example via the hydrocarbons
and revenue-sharing laws. They want Kirkuk and its oil
wealth to stay under federal government authority.
They also aspire to strong trading relations with the
Kurds. Turkey in particular is keen to buy and/or
export the KRG´s oil and gas and increase its
companies´ investments there; it sees development of
the KRG´s own mineral resources as a lesser long-term
threat than inclusion of Kirkuk in the Kurdistan
region. States such as Turkey and Iran also insist
that the KRG crack down on violent non-state actors
using Iraqi Kurdistan as a safe haven, notably the PKK
and its Iran-focused sister organisation PJAK. 179
To protect their core interests, all actors will have
to give something up. The KRG would have to defer its
exclusive claim to Kirkuk. However, it could maintain
the status quo in Kirkuk – demographic plurality and
de facto political control – while continuing the
process of normalisation, which should be placed under
international supervision to review changes made since
April 2003 and prevent any future demographic
manipulation.
In addition to compromising on Kirkuk, which would
allay the fears of Iraqi Arabs and the three
neighbours, the KRG would almost certainly have to
severely constrain the PKK. In exchange, trading
channels could be widened, 180 and neighbouring states
would stop interfering in the Kurdistan region´s
affairs, whether directly or by proxy. Finally, the
KRG would have to bring its contracts with
international oil companies in line with a new federal
hydrocarbons law.
Arabs would have to agree that certain
majority-Kurdish districts join the Kurdistan region
via a UNAMI-guided process and that the KRG be
allowed, under the new hydrocarbons law, to manage its
own oil and gas industry, consistent with a federal
strategy and guidelines. They also would need to
acquiesce in a special status for Kirkuk and perhaps
certain other disputed territories that would reduce
the federal government´s direct control. To permit the
Kurdistan region´s development after decades of
neglect, the federal government would have to grant
the KRG an agreed and guaranteed share of the federal
budget, as well as the right to issue contracts, as
long as it renders these contracts consistent with
standards outlined in the federal hydrocarbons law.
The federal government should publicly acknowledge the
original crimes that added impetus to the Kurds´
demands over Kirkuk: Arabisation, the 1988 Anfal
campaign and the gas attacks against Kurdish civilians
during the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war, most notably
at Halabja. 181 Playing down these events or denying
them outright would do little to dampen the Kurds´
ambitions. Instead, the government should publicly
recognise the former regime´s crimes and their victims
and offer financial compensation to survivors.
For its part, Turkey would have to accept new
realities, first and foremost the existence on its
border of a Kurdistan region of unprecedented power
and wealth. In exchange for concessions on Kirkuk and
the PKK, and once a federal hydrocarbons law is in
place, Turkey should actively promote open trade with
the Kurdistan region and in particular purchase and/or
export its oil and gas. This means dampening
ultranationalist sentiments opposed to any type of
relationship with Iraqi Kurds. An agreement endorsed
by Iraq´s various communities and accepted by Turkey
would be particularly important to Turkomans, whose
survival as a small minority depends on a national
consensus and a lessening of nationalist tensions in
ethnically diverse areas.
The status of Kirkuk and its internal power
arrangements will be among the most complex issues to
address. 182 Many Kirkukis point out that, as a
multi-ethnic city, Kirkuk requires a multi-ethnic
solution. 183 As Crisis Group proposed in an earlier
report, one possible compromise is for Kirkuk to
become either a stand-alone governorate administered
by the federal government but with significant de
facto ties to the KRG, or a uni-governorate federal
region with (under the constitution) enhanced powers.
184 In any comprehensive deal, moreover, the window on
Kirkuk´s possible incorporation into the Kurdistan
region should be kept ajar via a mechanism designed to
determine the area´s status following an interim
period, given Kurdish sensitivities. In the past,
Crisis Group has suggested ten years. 185 There are
growing voices among Kurdish elites in (or from)
Kirkuk advocating this kind of solution, even though
they continue to believe Kirkuk eventually will join
the Kurdistan region. 186 During the interim period,
power should be shared between Kirkuk´s main
communities. This is a principle to which all have
agreed. 187 The challenge will be to find a specific
formula they can accept as well. As noted above, when
President Jalal Talabani made a visit of great
symbolic and political significance to Kirkuk in late
January 2008, he met with representatives of all sides
and reportedly committed that appointments to major
administrative positions would be allocated on the
32-32-32-4 per cent basis between, respectively,
Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans and Christians. The KRG had
already agreed to this formula for the yet to be
created Kirkuk city council 188 but has rejected it
for the provincial council, on which the Kurds
currently hold a majority. Arabs and Turkomans, in
turn, have rejected elections to the provincial
council. Under Article 23 of the September 2008
provincial elections law, a committee is to present a
consensus-based recommendation on the form of
provincial elections in Kirkuk.
A compromise solution could involve something between
an election and a power-sharing arrangement: a caucus
election within each community for a fixed number of
council seats, 189 with the number of seats tilting
further toward the Kurds. Indeed, a formula for such a
quota-based election would have to recognise the
Kurds´ political and demographic power, without giving
them an absolute majority, while allowing the
Christians to hold the critical swing votes: either 24
Arab – 24 Turkoman – 48 Kurd – 4 Christian, or
23-23-46-8. 190
For all other levels in the governorate (executive
positions, district, sub-district and city council
seats, as well as senior directorate positions), the
32-32-32-4 formula would be applied.
In outline, a grand bargain would essentially be an
"oil-for-soil" deal – the KRG gives up or defers its
exclusive claim on Kirkuk governorate in exchange for
the right to manage its own oil and gas industry and
export what it produces. It would contain the
following elements:
Territory. UNAMI would guide a process to delineate a
contiguous internal boundary for the Kurdistan region
by making specific recommendations to the federal
government to allocate districts and sub-districts to
either a governorate in the Kurdistan region or their
current governorate, based on the criteria it used in
its phase one proposal of 5 June 2008. Kirkuk
governorate would become a stand-alone governorate, or
single-governorate region (to be determined), on an
interim basis for a period of ten years. During that
interim period, power would be shared and a mechanism
would be established with UN assistance to determine
the governorate´s ultimate status. The federal
government would submit UNAMI´s recommendations as a
yes/no proposal to a popular referendum in the areas
concerned and implement it, if and when approved,
consistent with Article 140 of the constitution.
Resources. Parliament would approve and the executive
enact a federal hydrocarbons law (and companion
revenue-sharing law) that provides for equitable
development of oil and gas throughout Iraq, including
the Kurdistan region; accepts the Kurdish oil and gas
law; and recognises the KRG´s right both to manage its
own fields and to export oil and gas.
Powers. The devolution of powers to the Kurdistan
region would remain as stated in the 2005
constitution.
Constitution. The constitution would be amended to
reflect the above compromises on territory and
resources, as well as Kirkuk´s status. In addition,
all sides would agree to a ten-year moratorium on the
formation of federal regions south of the Kurdistan
region and a constitutional limit on the size of such
regions to three governorates (Baghdad excluded, which
would remain a decentralised capital). 191
International Support. The UN Security Council would
endorse UNAMI´s recommendations, as well as the
federal government´s decisions concerning the above.
Turkey-KRG Relations. The KRG would restrict the
movement of PKK personnel in the Kurdistan region,
disarm its fighters in areas under effective KRG
control and prevent them from using the region as a
staging area for armed attacks in Turkey. 192 Turkey
would establish formal ties with the KRG, put in place
an economic policy of open borders with Iraq (in
effect the Kurdistan region), encourage investment by
its companies in the Kurdistan region and allow the
KRG to export oil and gas to its Mediterranean port of
Ceyhan.
Elections. Provincial elections would take place as
per the provincial elections law approved in September
2008, by 31 January 2009. Elections to the Kirkuk
provincial council would be carried out once election
rules have been set in a separate law and a
power-sharing arrangement for key positions has been
put in place as part of a UNAMI-guided process,
according to Article 23 of the provincial elections
law.
Power sharing in Kirkuk. Senior executive (governor,
deputy governor), administrative (directors general
and their deputies) and quasi-legislative (district,
sub-district and city council) positions would be
distributed among Arabs, Turkomans, Kurds and
Christians according to a 32-32-32-4 per cent formula.
Provincial council seats would be divided among these
communities according to either a 24-24-48-4 or a
23-23-46-8 per cent formula prior to elections, which
should be held as caucuses within each community for
the designated seats.
The U.S. has an important role
to play to make the grand bargain a reality. It should
move beyond mere support of UNAMI´s effort to
communicating to all stakeholders what it considers
necessary parameters of a solution as negotiations on
the full range of fundamental concerns – power,
resources, territories – reach the endgame. This would
have to include an unambiguous signal to the Kurdish
leadership that Washington will not support its quest
to incorporate Kirkuk but instead would be prepared to
establish appropriate security arrangements for the
Kurdistan region if its leaders agreed to at least
defer their exclusive claim to Kirkuk at this time.
The odds against a grand bargain are enormous. Iraqi
parties still hold to incompatible positions, and
potentially destabilising factors abound. Washington´s
policy will be in a transitional stage until sometime
in the first half of 2009, when a new administration
settles in and frames its approach. Iraq will go
through two critical electoral exercises in the span
of a year: provincial elections by 31 January and a
parliamentary contest before the end of 2009.
Integration of the awakening councils´ members into
the security apparatus and bureaucracy remains
doubtful, their loyalty uncertain. And Kirkuk´s
undecided status will continue to be a lightning rod
for rival Kurdish and Arab nationalisms, struck with
each unilateral move, whether in the form of military
manoeuvres, oil contracts signed or wells dug
somewhere in the disputed territories.
These obstacles notwithstanding, there is little time
to waste. The current effort to reach agreement on a
hydrocarbons and related laws as well as on the
constitutional review is unlikely to succeed; the same
goes for efforts to determine a workable and
consensus-based power-sharing arrangement in Kirkuk.
Meanwhile, U.S. leverage inevitably will diminish as
its forces begin to leave Iraq.
V. Conclusions
Difficult negotiations over a provincial elections law
in July-September 2008 were only the latest indication
of the centrality of the Kirkuk question. A minority
in Iraq, the Kurds have deployed all available legal
and institutional mechanisms to facilitate their quest
for Kirkuk. Still, they have failed to overcome the
odds. The result has been a growing political standoff
that is immediately destabilising – witness
developments in and around Khanaqin in
August-September – and, perhaps even more dangerously,
challenges the foundations of the post-2003 order.
The territorial dispute stems from a deeper
Arab-Kurdish conflict that has its origins in the
state´s creation almost a century ago and has yet to
be settled, whether through accommodation or by force.
At its core it is a struggle between rival
nationalisms with conflicting territorial claims to
border areas, which the two groups claim based on
historical demographic presence rather than on
established boundaries, which never existed. Today,
the goal should be a negotiated, consensus-based
accommodation enshrined in the constitution, ratified
in a referendum and guaranteed by the international
community.
Deadlocked negotiations over the hydrocarbons and
related laws, the architecture of federalism and the
constitution review, together with growing tensions in
disputed territories such as Khanaqin, suggest that
these negotiations ought to shift from their focus on
single issues to a grand bargain. A comprehensive
approach will demand painful compromises from key
stakeholders – principally Arabs and Kurds – who will
be unable to provide their constituencies all they had
promised them. It also will require overcoming deeply
entrenched fears and mistrust. In the words of a KRG
official:
The disputed territories and natural resources – these
are part of our national question. We prefer a
peaceful solution via dialogue, but we cannot clap
with one hand. The Iraqi situation is highly complex,
and the Arab leaders have their own problems. If Iraq
became more stable, then what would the Arabs think?
Historically, whenever the Arabs were weak, they made
deals with the Kurds. Then once they gained strength,
they abrogated them. Even if the international
community is supporting us today, the fear is there.
93
The parties´ challenge is to agree on an overarching
formula regarding all core areas of concern that will
allay their respective fears. The grand bargain
proposed in this report aims at such an outcome and,
as such, could be an important step toward rebuilding
and stabilising the Iraqi state. However, if talks
toward a compromise should fail, whatever peace and
legitimacy is gained from twin elections in 2009 will
be frittered away, and violence may once again take
the place of politics and negotiations.
Kirkuk / Brussels, 28 October 2008
Notes
168 Crisis Group interview, Suleimaniya, 23 June 2008.
169. Crisis Group interview, a Kurdistan Alliance
member of the council of representatives, Amman, March
2008.
170. Signs are that this is happening. A KRG official
was outspoken: "The Kurds had a historical opportunity
to bring Kirkuk into Kurdistan, but our leadership
lost this opportunity". Crisis Group interview,
Suleimaniya, 21 October 2008.
171. Crisis Group interview, international energy
expert, Amman, 28 November 2006.
172. Many Kurds saw in the Maliki government´s
August-September 2008 actions in Khanaqin and its
sub-districts a harbinger of a resurgent central
government intent on stifling Kurdish aspirations
(even if military pressure was directed at areas
outside the Kurdistan region), as it has often over
the past century. For example, Mahmoud Othman, a
veteran Kurdish leader and lawmaker, declared: "The
Khanaqin issue is a very small part of the conflict
with the Maliki government because the conflict is
about whether Iraq is a federal country in which those
who are participating in the government are making
decisions together, or whether it´s a central
government as in the past, run by the Prime Minister
and his party". Quoted on Sbeiy.com, an independent
Kurdish web-based news agency linked to Kurdish leader
Neywshirwan Mustafa Amin, 2 September 2008.
173. The KRG recognises that Turkey is likely to be
its only significant economic partner for some time,
as well as a necessary bridge to the West. Fuad
Hussein, chief of staff to KRG President Masoud
Barzani, said, "It is up to us to be close to Turkey.
We like its model of democratic values. By force of
geography, Turkey is our window on the West. We want
to have an economic open door. Turkey won´t find any
other friends in Iraq, so our relationship will be
mutually beneficial. De facto, the Kurds are friends
of the Turks and can protect Turkey´s interests,
something the Turkomans cannot do. Plus both of us are
friends of the West, so everything is aligned. We have
much in common". Crisis Group interview, Salah al-Din,
28 January 2008.
174. This is true even of ISCI, which (jointly with
the Kurdish parties) has advocated a region formation
process that would gut critical central state powers.
In its view, division into regions would not lead to
dissolution. See Crisis Group Middle East Report Nº70,
Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of the Supreme
Council, 15 November 2007, pp. 17-18. Iraqis are
deeply divided over the extent to which Iraq should be
decentralised, if at all. Crisis Group Report, Iraq
After the Surge II, op. cit., pp. 11-14.
175. An Arab politician said, "Although my village is
nearer to Tikrit [the capital of Salah al-Din
governorate], I belong to Kirkuk. It has nothing to do
with oil. We never had any benefit from oil under
Saddam Hussein. We have co-existed for a long time in
Kirkuk. Our economic links are with Kirkuk". Crisis
Group interview, Sa´doun Fandy, head of the Arab
Consultative Council, Kirkuk, 22 June 2008. A Chaldo-Assyrian
politician agreed: "Hawija is historically,
geographically and administratively part of Kirkuk. In
1957 [the monarchy´s dying days], Tikrit was a qadha
[district] in Baghdad governorate, and Hawija was a
qadha in Kirkuk". Crisis Group interview, Kirkuk, 22
June 2008. Even a Kurdish intellectual originally from
Kirkuk asserted: "In Ottoman times, Hawija was part of
Shahrazour [a predominantly Kurdish region that
Kurdish nationalists use as the historical basis for
their claim to independence]. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, [Kurdish leader] Sheikh Mahmoud was
recognised as the local authority, who was in conflict
with the nascent Iraqi state. In the 1920s the Obeidi
tribe came to Hawija and asked Sheikh Mahmoud for
permission to settle there, and this was agreed by
consensus. The Jubour tribe came later, and neither
were they rejected. They settled on agricultural land
that no Kurd wanted. Sheikh Mahmoud had asked Kurds to
settle there but there were no takers. I don´t know
why: It is a very rich area. After the tribes settled,
the government set up an irrigation project to help
increase agricultural production. Arabs started coming
to the city [Kirkuk] to sell their produce. Over time
they settled there and began to intermarry with
Turkomans and Kurds, and they were well-respected
because all of this was based on consensus. What
changed the situation was [regime-driven] Arabisation
in the 1970s". Crisis Group interview, Suleimaniya, 26
June 2008.
176. The PUK´s Neywshirwan Mustafa Amin, among others,
has suggested Hawija become the capital of a new
(Arab) governorate. Crisis Group interview,
Suleimaniya, 23 June 2008. Others, such as Nouri
Talabany, an independent member of the Kurdistan
national assembly, have proposed it become part of
neighbouring Salah al-Din governorate. Crisis Group
interview, Erbil, 17 June 2008.
177. While governorates hold extensive powers under
the February 2008 law on governorates not organised
into a region compared to the pre-2003 period (for
example, to elect and remove governors, prepare the
governorate budget and manage oil and gas wealth),
governorates that choose to become a stand-alone
region or join other governorates to form a
multi-governorate region hold even greater powers
under the 2005 constitution, including to adopt a
constitution and establish internal security forces.
178. An Arab leader in Kirkuk said, "Kirkuk should be
a stand-alone governorate linked to Baghdad. We don´t
want Kirkuk to be a federal region, because we are
afraid the Kurds would then seek to isolate and sever
Hawija from Kirkuk. This is why we want to keep the
link with the centre. It is the only objection we have
to Kirkuk´s status as a stand-alone region. If we had
guarantees Hawija would stay with Kirkuk, we would no
longer object, but the better guarantee is to keep the
Baghdad link, as in Baghdad [the council of
representatives] we can protect our interests". Crisis
Group interview, Sa´doun Fandy, Kirkuk, 22 June 2008.
179. PJAK is the Party of Free Life for Kurdistan (Partîya
Jîyana Azadîya Kurdistanê), which has bases in the
Qandil mountain range in the Kurdistan region, from
which its fighters have launched raids into Iran.
180. Fully and successfully settling the PKK question
in Kurdistan likely depends on an overall political
solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey. In its
absence, the KRG could limit the PKK´s freedom of
action, as proposed in Crisis Group Middle East Report
N°64, Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis,
19 April 2007, pp. 16-19. A KRG official, who referred
to the first meeting between Turkish officials and KRG
Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani in Baghdad on 1 May
2008 as a "breakthrough", said, "We understand the PKK
is a problem. But there is no military solution. We
want good relations with Turkey based on mutual
respect. We don´t allow Kurdish territory to be used
by anyone against any neighbour. But the KRG will take
no further steps against the PKK. Turkey faced a lot
of difficulties in the latest operations [in February
2008]. If Turkey were to adopt a political solution
toward the PKK, we would help with that". Crisis Group
interview, Falah Mustafa Bakir, chief of the KRG
foreign relations department, Erbil, 29 June 2008.
181. See Iraq´s Crime of Genocide, op. cit., and Joost
R. Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and
the Gassing of Halabja (Cambridge, 2007).
182. If Kirkuk were to become a stand-alone entity,
its territory would cover the bulk of the geological
structure of the Kirkuk oil field, as well as the Bai
Hassan and Jambour fields.
183. Crisis Group interview, Rakan Saeed, deputy
governor, Kirkuk, 19 June 2008. Saeed, an Arab,
pointed out that Kirkuk has accommodated various
groups over time: "Kirkuk is originally a Turkoman
city; the plurality of its inhabitants were Turkomans,
living inside the city. When oil was found, members of
all communities were attracted. You can see from the
city´s composition how urban migration took place:
Arabs in the southern and western parts, Kurds in the
north and east".
184. See Crisis Group Report, Iraq and the Kurds, op.
cit., pp. i-ii, 17-19. Even as a stand-alone
governorate, Kirkuk would have greater powers than as
part of the highly centralised Kurdistan region – a
point not lost on Kurdish officials in Kirkuk. Natali,
"The Kirkuk Conundrum", op. cit. Its economic strength
would be further enhanced if formerly Kirkuk districts
such as Chamchamal and Kalar, in Suleimaniya
governorate, were to be restored. Both have enormous
potential oil and gas resources. For this reason, KRG
leaders may have to think twice about their earlier
proposal that former Kirkuk districts be reattached,
as the 2004 TAL and 2005 constitutions prescribe.
Crisis Group interviews, Erbil, 16-17 June 2008, and
Kirkuk, 18-19 June 2008.
185. See Crisis Group Middle East Report N°56, Iraq
and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle Over Kirkuk, 18 July
2006.
186. Crisis Group interviews, Amin Shwan, Kurdish
intellectual, Kirkuk, 18 June 2008, Nouri Talabany,
independent member of Kurdistan national assembly
originally from Kirkuk, Erbil, 17 June 2008. An
alternative would involve placing the Kirkuk oil field
in a virtual quarantine or neutral zone, in which all
stakeholders would have joint rights under a federal
hydrocarbons law, with the federal government holding
ultimate sovereign rights. The administrative status
of Kirkuk governorate and city would become less
emotionally charged and could be settled more easily.
Crisis Group interview, international energy expert,
Istanbul, 5 July 2008. It is an interesting,
insufficiently explored idea worthy of discussion by
stakeholders in grand bargain negotiations.
187. Crisis Group interviews, political leaders of all
four communities, Kirkuk, 18-19, 22 June 2008.
188. In an accord brokered by the local U.S.
provincial reconstruction team and signed on 2
December 2007, Kirkuk´s Arab and Kurdish leaders
agreed to a series of items, including creation of a
21-member city council, with seats allocated by the
32-32-32-4 formula. The Turkomans were not party to
the agreement but in September 2008 agreed to the
council and appointed one of their own as council
chairman (an Arab was his deputy). Arabs, Kurds and
Turkomans took six seats each, Christians three.
189. Under the 2008 provincial powers law, each
provincial council should have 25 seats plus one for
every 200,000 inhabitants. Kirkuk governorate is
believed to have 1 million to 1.2 million inhabitants,
or five-six extra seats for a total of 30 or 31. A
possible distribution could therefore be seven Arabs,
seven Turkomans, fourteen Kurds, three Christians
(22.5-22.5-45-10 per cent).
190. This is the formula used, in more or less those
percentages, in 2003-2005, before the first elections.
In 2003, the CPA established a 30-seat provincial
council in Kirkuk with eleven Kurds, seven Christians,
six Arabs and six Turkomans. Crisis Group noted in a
previous report that the Christian Chaldo-Assyrians
played a pivotal role in reducing tensions. Considered
non-threatening by the larger communities, they mostly
remained on the sidelines, keeping a low profile and
mediating when asked. "When the groups in Kirkuk
cannot agree on something, they agree that a Christian
should represent them", said a Western observer.
Crisis Group interview, Kirkuk, 3 November 2004. The
seven Christians voted with whatever community
threatened to be a minority on a given issue, thus
preventing controversial – but also important –
decisions from being taken. When Arabs and Turkomans
united in the council, for example, the Chaldo-Assyrians
tended to side with the Kurds. "We don´t want to
change the status quo", said an Assyrian politician.
"We will seek to maintain it at all cost. Kirkuk is a
bomb about to go off, and we don´t want to be the
trigger – or the victims". Crisis Group interview,
Srood Mattei, Erbil, 2 November 2004. Crisis Group
Middle East Report N°35, Iraq: Allaying Turkish Fears
Over Kurdish Ambitions, 26 January 2005, pp. 4-6.
While not a recipe for effective governance, sharing
power may help restore trust between communities and
the parties claiming to represent them.
191. Crisis Group has argued for an asymmetric
federalism that would preserve Iraq while meeting
basic Kurdish aspirations and offering necessary
minimum protections to all communities. Arab Iraq
would be divided into fifteen decentralised
governorates, relying on present boundaries, which
would enjoy significant powers and fair access to oil
revenues. This approach has significant merit: as a
form of federalism, it is accepted by all main
players; it allows a workable and fair formula for
sharing oil revenues, a principle all advance; it
confirms the Kurdistan region, another consensus
point; it circumscribes the state´s powers, addressing
fears of excessive central rule; and by dividing Arab
Iraq into geographically-defined entities, it is
non-ethnic and non-sectarian and would prevent one
community´s domination. Most importantly, it could
hold the country together without posing an
existential threat to any single community. A
variation would be to limit the size of regions to
three governorates and delay the process of region
formation for ten years. See Crisis Group Middle East
Report N°60, After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq,
19 December 2006, pp. 15-18.
192. Crisis Group has recommended that the KRG state
publicly it will not tolerate the PKK in the Kurdistan
region unless it agrees to abandon its armed struggle
and disarms, and in the meantime: (a) continue to
contain and isolate it and deny it freedom of movement
within the region; (b) halt all supplies to it; (c)
shut down its media operations and prevent journalists
from visiting it in the Qandil mountain range; and (d)
in response to a Turkish amnesty for lower- and
mid-level cadres, allow senior leaders, once disarmed,
to integrate into the Kurdistan region and similarly
agree to absorb any refugees from the Makhmour camp
who refuse to return to Turkey. Crisis Group Report,
Iraq and the Kurds, op. cit., p. ii.
193. Crisis Group interview, Osman Haji Mahmoud, KRG
minister of state for the interior for the PUK,
Suleimaniya, 26 June 2008.
Note
Picture: Administrative divisions and provinces of
Iraq become often a matter of speculation and elements
of an abusive argumentation; in fact, they are
meaningless. They only represent colonial needs and
choices in Iraq. They are fake and they must be
replaced by new borders that will reflect the reality
of ethno-religious groups´ territorial demarcations
and the eagerness for Justice, which means return of
all who have been forced to emigrate over the past 130
years, and proper recompense.
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin
Megalommatis
